I was excited to hear that FTP would be discussing Obama's decision to approve a troop increase to Afghanistan. Counterinsurgency happens to be my area of study, and this pivotal moment greatly interested me. Therefore, I'd like to share a few thoughts and hear some feedback.
First, I think we should recognize a few realities. This decision had to be a very difficult one for the President to make, and will most certainly define his presidency. Committing troops to Afghanistan symbolizes a presidential sanction of our efforts in that region. And as much as I hate agreeing with Michael Moore, sending more troops will make Obama the "new war president," meaning, he will own this war. Honestly, I believe that the President painted himself into a corner. On the campaign trail, Obama made sure to draw a moral distinction between the invasion of Iraq and the invasion of Afghanistan. President Obama joined many by declaring Afghanistan to be the "good war," opposed to the country's misguided efforts in Iraq.
Nevertheless, while public opinion is entitled to shift without any real accountability demanded, politicians are held to their words. Obama approved of the war in Afghanistan on the campaign trail, and naturally, as the President of the United States of America, Obama was compelled to reaffirm that approval despite the rapid deterioration of support from his most ardent constituents.
With this in mind, we should ask ourselves if the President's commitment to the war in Afghanistan is truly sincere. And with no disrespect to the Commander-in-Chief, I am forced to determine that the answer is 'no.' Along with the 30,000 troop increase comes a measure to begin scaling back our forces after 18 months. To anyone with a shred of understanding, such a timetable seems incredibly narrow, especially when considering the objectives which we are attempting to accomplish there.
And that leads me to acknowledge some grim realities about our involvement in Afghanistan. What exactly do we hope to achieve? We are trying to prove the exception to a long tradition of failures. It is also important to remember that we are finding ourselves more isolated in Afghanistan, as support from our NATO allies is at an all-time low. Despite the previous president's past condemnation of nation-building, nation-building is exactly what we have chained ourselves to in Afghanistan. By attempting to instill the rule-of-law to a traditionally lawless country, by promoting democratic values and establishing liberal institutions, and through our unyielding support of a centralized government, we are in fact nation-building. And while the President claims to have only one objective in Afghanistan: disrupting and dismantling Al Qaeda, nation-building is going to continue, regardless. As much as we would like to see ourselves respecting the local culture and ethnic identities of Afghans, we are deliberately seeking to inject a new culture into Afghanistan, and construct a new narrative for Afghans to refer to, one in which the United States is central.
As Stephen Tanner points out in his fabulous military history of Afghanistan (Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the War Against the Taliban):
We need to determine what our priorities in the region are, and furthermore, decide to either commit to or refrain from an active counterinsurgency effort. Sure enough, we have a reason to be in Afghanistan. Al Qaeda still has a presence in the AfPak region, and continues to operate through insurgent groups such as the Taliban. Not to mention, the idea of a neighboring failed state (Pakistan) with caches of nuclear weapons should remain a serious concern for the United States as well as the rest of the free world. Nevertheless, we need to either decisively secure the countryside gradually through engagement of local mullahs and tribal leaders, conduct special operations against terrorist threats, and mount a well-organized counterinsurgency effort to fend off the Taliban- a decision which will most certainly keep us in the region for decades to come- or we should more or less, abandon Afghanistan and rely upon our counter-terrorist capabilities to check Al Qaeda the best we can. From my vantage point, there really isn't much of an "in-between.""In the end, battles for Afghanistan are not about politics or economics, but about culture."
President Obama's meager commitment of 30,000 troops with an 18 month timetable doesn't mean much without a clearly defined plan of action and a reassessment of our objectives. After all, Obama has revealed that most of the 30,000 troops will secure "key population centers," which really doesn't make much sense at all. More than twenty years ago, the Soviets felt that they had succeeded in Afghanistan by controlling larger cities and roads. Yet much to their chagrin, the real threat came not from the cities (which have always been easily conquered), but from the volatile countryside, where currently, the Taliban has great influence. While I have faith that the President and his generals can achieve success in the region, I have my doubts that the current initiative will yield the kind of results we are all hoping for. From a counterinsurgency perspective, a troop increase doesn't necessarily lead to overall success. A truly successful effort will require a lot of time, plenty of local engagement, and "soft-power" strength.
Bottom-line: We need to either decide to stay and mount a substantive counterinsurgency effort, replete with more troops, government reforms, and lots of "soft-power," or we need to simply abandon the region entirely and resort to counter-terrorism efforts. Either way, I have a feeling that President Obama has a tiger by the tail, and unless he can truly commit himself to a distinct direction in Afghanistan, he will suffer greatly because of it.
- Marc Neilsen
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